Obviously this reinterpretation of foreign affairs in the late 1940's is founded on a broad range of events, and findings on the effect of a single event no matter how dramatic can neither confirm nor deny revisionist history. Yet, this history relies heavily upon the assumption that elites could easily manipulate public opinion. The Truman Doctrine speech is regarded by some prominent revisionist historians such as Freeland, Theoharis, LaFeber, Feis, and Kolko as one of Truman's most prominent and successful efforts. 4 In investigating the public's response to Truman's March 12 address, we have an opportunity to examine, in part, revisionist claims about how opinion climates were formed during this period. For students of the presidency, the Truman Doctrine speech provides an interesting test case for exploring the potentialities and limitations of a president's ability to shape public opinion. Before developing and testing revisionist and other models of public opinion, however, we need to have a more thorough description of the stimuli to which the public presumably responded. We need to know what the President said and how he said it.
The Political Context
Specifically, the speech called for congressional authorization to provide Greece and Turkey with $400 million in economic and military assistance. Describing the deterioration of the Greek economy and the inability of its military to cope with communist guerilla activities, Truman starkly predicted that if the U.S. did not shortly replace the evacuating British forces, Greece would fall to the Communists, with Turkey and the rest of the Middle East succumbing in turn. But he went beyond simply requesting aid authorization. He described a bipolar world of democracy versus totalitarianism and called for the U.S. to assist "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation." Two major sections depicted the Communist threat and the American 22 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY challenge. Midway through the speech he turned from his discussion of Greece and Turkey and spoke more generally:
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
I believe that we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.
He concluded with a peroration of even greater generality:
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life had died.
We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.
Greater responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.
I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely. 5 At the close of the speech the assembled joint session responded with a standing ovation and the immediate response of most news columnists and newspapers was favorable. There was some opposition, however, and it would be months before the aid authorization would pass Congress. Henry Wallace, who the next year would run for president against Truman as a third party candidate, went on nationwide radio to lambast the speech and characterize Truman "as the best salesman Communism ever had."6 A number of prominent Senators ranging the ideological spectrum from Taft to Pepper publicly expressed reservations.
After having experienced the Cold War rhetoric of the fifties, one may not find much in Truman's statements that is particularly arousing or inflammatory. But it must be remembered that this was the first time that a president had publicly recognized the Soviet Union as an enemy and depicted the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. Despite the disappointments after Yalta, Truman had repeatedly resisted publicly making such statements. Even now some of his closest advisers were disturbed by the speech's tenor. Secretary of State George C. Marshall in route to a Moscow conference was "somewhat startled to see the extent to which the anti-Communist element . . . was stressed."7 James Byrnes, who had recently resigned as Secretary of State, complained that the speech was too general in tone and commitments.8 George Kennan, shortly to be head of the State Department's policy-planning staff, also objected to the "sweeping nature of the commitments."9 And Bernard Baruch described it as "tantamount to a declaration of... an ideological or religious war." 10 It is obvious from reading the memoirs of those who participated in drafting the speech that President Truman had intended it to be hortatory and unrestrained. Several days earlier at a White House briefing for a number of important senators and congressmen, he had viewed the chilly response accorded Secretary Marshall's humanitarian reasons for giving assistance to Greece and Turkey. Only after Acheson's presentation of the issue in strong anticommunist terms did they warm to the proposal.11 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the respected foreign policy expert in the Senate, advised the President that he would have to "scare hell out of the country" if he wanted to get authorization through Congress.12 Moreover, other recent administration reconstruction programs had received hostile responses from Congress and clearly would never be reported out of committee. Finally, Truman's vivid account of the speech writing reveals the dramatic rhetorical style he wanted infused into the text.
The drafting of the actual message which I would deliver to the Congress had meanwhile been started in the State SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY Department. The first version was not at all to my liking. The writers had filled the speech with all sorts of background data and statistical figures about Greece and made the whole thing sound like an investment prospectus. I returned this draft to Acheson with a note asking for more emphasis on a declaration of general policy. The department's draftsmen then rewrote the speech to include a general policy statement, but it seemed to me half-hearted. The key sentence, for instance, read, "I believe that it should be the policy of the United States . . . " I took my pencil, scratched out "should" and wrote in "must." . .. I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America's answer to surge of expansion of Communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.13
As Freeland has summed up the statement, President Truman committed himself and the nation to a "broad interpretative framework" of a "global assault of the 'totalitarian' forces against the forces of 'freedom'-calculated to command immediately the maximum public support."14 When Marshall complained to the President that he had "overstated it a bit," Truman quickly replied that it had been necessary to receive favorable congressional treatment. 15 We have in the event of the Truman Doctrine statement a clear attempt on the part of a president to mobilize public and congressional support behind his policies. Although it is impossible to state authoritatively how greatly the public disposition had to be altered, it was probably a great deal. All actors, including the President, perceived an isolationist mood and believed that only the most dramatic presentation would win sufficient public approval. Perhaps a closer reexamination of Gallup poll responses taken two weeks after the speech will produce a better picture of what happened to public opinion as a result of the President's appeal. A number of standard questions will be addressed in investigating his opinion leadership. Was the President's message widely received? Did it increase the salience of the issue he was advocating? Did his efforts actually change public opinion in the intended direction? And, of more general theoretic importance, were there attitudinal and social attributes within the public which affected exposure to the President's communication and influenced support for his program?
Public Familiarity with the Truman Doctrine Speech
The President delivered his address to Congress on March 12. The speech and reactions to it, as well as developments in Greece and Turkey, received daily front page coverage in newspapers throughout the country from the next day until the Gallup survey on March 26. 16 Even if the speech were not initially heard over the radio by all, it would still be difficult not to be familiar with it because it was given such extensive subsequent news coverage. By March 26, 84 percent of a national sample reported that they had heard or read about the President's address. Although this is not everyone, it does compare favorably with public familiarity about other events. For example, other of Truman's proposals lagged far behind in public familiarity. In early July, only 54 percent of the public had heard about the Marshall Plan although the name coined by the President had been bandied back and forth between advocates and critics for several months. Over a year later, when the plan was being implemented, fewer were familiar with it than had heard or read about the Truman Doctrine speech within a twoweek period.17 In May, 1950, only 23 percent had heard of Truman's Point Four Program. Only 71 percent claimed familiarity with the Taft-Hartly legislation, in mid-1948 although it was a major campaign issue, and in 1963 the same percentage was familiar with the Peace Corps two years after it had been in operation. Only major international events and crises such as Sputnik, the U-2 incident, and the Berlin crisis in 1961 reached a higher plateau of public familiarity. Without the advantage of television, President Truman demonstrated the ability of a president to command the public's attention.
Who comprised the small minority unfamiliar with the presidential address? By identifying these segments of the population we may obtain a better understanding of his opinion leadership potential. Many studies have found that key variables such as education and political participation are correlated with attentiveness and awareness of political issues and events.18 However, as a message source, the president is special. He is the most visible person in the country, and presidential visibility means public accessibility. Personal attributes that activate individuals to seek out information may be of little importance when the president is intent on communicating with everyone. If so, only idiosyncratic factors such as illness or isolation would restrict reception.
In Table 1 we can examine the degree to which exposure to the communication was associated with the personal characteristics of the receiver. The evidence is clear. As we move from the upper left corner of the table where the poorly educated nonvoters are located to their opposites in the lower right corner, the percentage hearing or reading about the speech increases. Both education and participation display a consistent and positive effect on attentiveness. Although even a majority (60 percent) of those citizens least in touch with political events had heard or read about the speech, the President enjoyed greater access to citizens who were already highly attentive to public affairs. Only about one out of twenty of the well-educated voters was unaware of the event. If the pattern of relationships described in Table 1 is characteristic of other occasions as well, it suggests that, frequently when presidential messages receive substantially less attention, the president may be addressing a highly self-selected segment of the citizenry. Given the high overall level of public familiarity, it is not surprising to find in Table 2 that President Truman's national address coincided with heightened public salience of foreign problems. In March when asked on an open-ended question to name the nation's "most important problem," over half of the respondents identified foreign affairs, whereas only three months earlier barely a fifth had done so. By late summer pressing domestic problems had re-emerged as the dominant public concerns. Although events were beginning to occur quickly during this period, the Truman Doctrine speech was the most prominent foreign affairs event in the media between the December and March surveys, and the public's concern very probably reflects Truman's efforts in temporarily reordering public priorities.
Effects of the Speech on Public Opinion
Knowing that the President's address to the joint session of Congress was an important event not only in Washington but to the rest of the nation as well, its effect on public opinion deserves our careful examination. Revisionist history contains a model of opinion change. It emphasizes the fear arousal aspects of the rhetoric: we are told that on Senator Arthur Vandenberg's advice Truman consciously frightened the nation with the threat of communist aggression and mobilized this fear into public support for his economic aid program. According to revisionist historian Walter LaFeber, "Insofar as public opinion was concerned this tactic worked well for the Administration . . . . " And Arthur Theoharis argues that it "heightened public fears" and "contributed to a parochial, self-righteous nationalism."19 But did it really have these effects? To test this thesis we shall search for increased levels of anticommunism as a result of the speech, and for a close relationship between holding these opinions and endorsing the Truman Doctrine program.
The unavailability of "best" data has been a familiar and nagging problem to historians. And in the historical examination of public opinion where generally few reasonable assumptions and inferences are available, this problem has been especially acute. Alternative explanations abound and even with good detective work the real explanation cannot always be revealed. Secondary analysis of survey data is particularly hazardous, since an historical perspective will frequently suggest relationships not obvious to contemporary pollsters. Fortunately, the March 26 Gallup survey contains items which tap most of the variables we shall be considering. There is one deficiency, however. Although several questions in the survey deal with communism, none explicitly measures a perceived external communist threat. Instead, all are concerned with internal communism and contain a prominent civil liberties component. And all except one suffer from the additional drawback of either being too narrowly focused, subject to contamination by other events, or of exhibiting little variation in response because of poor question construction.20 28 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY The one item which seems to escape these problems asks the respondent, "Do you think the Communist Party in this country should be forbidden by law?" Sixty percent agreed, 30 percent disagreed, and 10 percent held no opinion. Later the question would frequently be asked by Gallup and the other national opinion survey organizations, but the March survey represents the first occasion where it was administered to a national sample. Although its reference is clearly internal communism, this should not pose a liability in examining the revisionist model. After all, according to revisionist history, the external and internal threats were closely associated in the public's mind and this association was in part attributable to politicians' efforts to make such a connection. Presumably the ultimate result of the Truman Doctrine was the suppression of civil liberties at home.
In Table 3 who had heard or read about the speech and those who had not (see Part A of Table 3 ) appears to be in the degree of opinionation. Exposure to the address is associated with a greater number of both anticommunist and prolibertarian opinions. In Part B we can see that, when respondents who held no opinion on the Forbid Communist Party question are eliminated from the percentaging, hearing or reading about the speech-contrary to the model-is associated with opposition to banning the Communist Party. The reason for this peculiar result probably reflects other differences among these respondents rather than reflecting any effect of the speech itself.21 In Table 1 we found that exposure was partially selfselective with the well-educated and politically participant respondents being more attentive. Hearing or reading about the President's speech, holding opinions on political questions, and favoring protection of civil liberties for communists may all be related to education and participation. Therefore, in order to evaluate the speech's effect on the level and direction of opinionation, we must examine these differences for similar types of respondents.
In Figure 1 , five groups of respondents were formed according to their education and participation. For each group, familiarity with the President's speech reduces the percentage not holding an opinion on the Forbid Communist Party question. Although it would be unwise to examine too closely the size of the differences given the small N's upon which percentaging is based, it is worth noting that for only one of the five subsamples (moderately educated voters) did hearing or reading about the speech not produced at least a ten percentage point reduction in the number not holding an opinion. As an extra precaution against spuriousness, the analysis was repeated filtering out respondents who failed to express opinions on another political, but unrelated, issue.22 The elimination of this small group had no significant effect on the distributions given in Figure 1 . Although we cannot be certain that spuriousness has been wholly eliminated, it does appear that familiarity with President Truman's speech increased the salience of the internal communism issue. Whether the resulting higher levels of opinionation were disproportionately distributed in the direction of anticommunist dispositions remains to be seen. Did Truman's speech increase antilibertarian sentiment? In one sense, it must have; as a result of hearing and reading about the speech, more people formed opinions and some surely adopted an anticommunist stance. The more important question, however, concerns whether the basic distribution of opinion was modified. Table 4 provides the data to examine the effects of the speech. The percentage point differences among those holding an opinion fail to reveal a dominant tendency for exposure to Truman's message to increase the level of anticommunist sentiment.23 For all but the poorly educated, the relationship between familiarity with the speech and anticommunist opinion is opposite from the predicted direction.
Presidents and scholars alike should recognize that the public is not equally attentive, and this fact may have important implications for a president's ability to persuade the citizenry in a given political context. Before casually imputing mass attitude change from presidential efforts, we first need to identify his audience. This should provide a clue as to how consequent his message will be on public opinion. There is some evidence in Table 4 that the effects hypothesized by revisionist history may have been produced among the least educated and nonparticipant segment of society. For these citizens, familiarity with a speech depicting an external threat may have decreased their support of civil liberties for communists. However, the President was talking disproportionately to other segments of the population who are better able to differentiate their environment and therefore less likely to generalize in this fashion. Moreover, the highly-educated and participant public who as a group were almost wholly familiar with the President's address are also the most likely to support civil liberties, and for them to assume an antilibertarian stance would have required greater attitude change. To conclude, those citizens who were most attentive to the President's message are the same persons who would be most resistant to linking the foreign policy statement to anticommunism at home.
There is some evidence and much argument that the public became less supportive of civil liberties from the late 1940's through the mid-1950's.Z A few historians have been anxious to blame the Truman administration for this development, claiming further that it was deliberate. President Truman was only one of a number of national leaders shaping opinion, and from his statements and policies he appears to have been more committed to the maintenance of civil liberties than most. Surely more important than political rhetoric in shaping public attitudes were events in Europe, the trial of Alger Hiss, and the Korean War. With the available data, the assertion of Truman's culpability can neither be totally confirmed nor denied. However, the Truman Doctrine speech represents his most forceful public expression of an anticommunist theme and it appears to have had little effect on public opinion about internal anticommunism. To the extent that this speech has been employed by critics to indict Truman for the McCarthy episode, such a charge is weakened by the evidence presented here.
Public Support for Truman's Greek-Turkish Aid Program
Subverting basic freedoms was plainly not the purpose of the speech. Instead its purpose was to commit the nation to the defense of Europe in general and specifically to extend economic aid to endangered Greece and Turkey. It is more important for understanding opinion leadership to discover if the speech accomplished its primary goal, and if so, to identify the dynamics of opinion change.
Two items in the survey measured public support for the President's legislative requests. In adjacent questions, the respondent was asked if he would like to see his congressman vote for or against Truman's $250 million aid request for Greece and $150 million for Turkey. The distribution of opinion is given in Table 5 . Given the newness of the issue, it is somewhat surprising that 85 percent of the sample expressed a preference, and nearly half felt very strongly either for or against the President's proposals. Aid to Greece was the more popular of the two requests; among respondents holding an opinion, 57 percent favored aid to Greece while only 47 percent favored a smaller amount to Turkey. The President's speech, as well as subsequent daily news reports, clearly identified Greece as being in a more precarious position. Turkey was described as having a relatively healthy economy and being in no immediate danger unless Greece collapsed. Critics of the proposal were quick to argue this point. Although perhaps short of a mandate, President Truman was immediately able to generate substantial public enthusiasm for his policy and in doing so obtained a valuable political resource for pushing the legislation through Congress. If contemporaneous readings of public opinion, admittedly uninformed by survey data, were correct in describing an isolationist opinion climate, then for much of the citizenry the percentages represent a sizable turnaround in public opinion. We come now to the question of who rallied behind the President's policies.
The second prediction of the revisionist model is that Truman traded upon anticommunism in mobilizing support for his foreign aid package. Although the Truman Doctrine speech does not appear to have stirred higher levels of anticommunist sentiment, such opinions 34 SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY could nonetheless, have served as a useful resource. If Truman rallied extant anticommunist sentiment behind his program, this would still fit well with a revisionist portrayal of events. On the test question, this would mean that respondents who would ban the Communist Party should be more enthusiastic for the $400 million aid package. In Table  6 we can see that approval of these requests is only slightly associated with anticommunist opinion, and the small percentage point differences may wholly result from random measurement error. This findingsurprising as it may be-corresponds closely with a finding reported by John Mueller in his recent study on public support for the Korean War. Examining responses to an October, 1950 Gallup survey, he discovered that opinions on the same Forbid Communist Party question were unrelated to two different measures of support for the Korean War.25 Although some attitude research during the mid-1950's found an empirical association in the public's perception of internal and external communist threats on diffuse, generalized variables, the evidence reported here should caution us from imposing a simple opinion structure on the mass public.26 Anticommunism at home does not necessarily strengthen a president's hand in fighting it abroad.
A voluminous and rich literature has accumulated in social psychology which describes an alternative model of opinion change. Simply stated, evaluation of the source should largely shape evaluation of the message. Decades of research in a variety of experimental settings have shown this to be a primary means of achieving cognitive balance in one's beliefs and opinions.27 Below is displayed the basic P-O-X triad common to virtually all of the consistency theories. The triad consists of the evaluator (P), the message (X), and its source (0). Given is a positive valence between the source and message. On occasion, individuals have shown surprising facility for distorting the environment rather than altering their own otherwise inconsistent preferences, but this is less likely to be true under a highly visible and salient context such as we have with the Truman Doctrine. Only respondents who reported familiarity with the speech were questioned further concerning their opinions about the foreign aid proposal. Few indeed who heard or read about the speech could have dissociated its proposals from the President with such a brief period of time.
Assuming then that misperception and other distortion mechanisms were for the most part absent and there is a positive valence between O and X-that is, President Truman is perceived as favoring aid to Greece and Turkey-the reference model predicts the following patterns in achieving consistency:
P -O and P -X = + or P -O and P -X = -Respondents will either like the President and prefer his policies or will dislike the President and oppose his policies. Of course, everyone may not arrive at a consistent set of opinions. Some may not find the incongruence "uncomfortable," and others may compartmentalize their evaluations to a point where the contradiction is unapparent. We speak then of a tendency or strain toward consistency.
Unlike the relationships for the Forbid Communist Party item, President Truman's job performance rating is moderately associated with endorsing his policies. On both policy questions in Table 7 the President's approvers show up more supportive than his detractors. His opinion. leadership was not limited to his admirers, however. A third of those respondents who disapproved of his job performance agreed with his aid program. Given a president's traditional role as spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs, this finding is not wholly surprising. That such support among disapprovers would be available on a variety of domestic issues is highly doubtful.
As a test of the reference model, a careful inspection of the percentages in Table 7 reveals that approximately two-thirds of the opinionated respondents consistently evaluated the source (P-O) and the message (P-X) in the same direction. About a third held an opinion on the aid request divergent with their evalutation of Truman as president. Implicit in the model is the assumption that evaluations of
Truman shaped preferences about his policies. Of course, the reverse causal relationship-namely, opinions about his policies influenced evaluations of his overall performance-would produce the same results. Either relationship is plausible and with the available evidence it is impossible to pin down conclusively which is the dominant causal direc-tion. There is some "circumstantial" evidence, however, to suggest that the relationship described in the reference model (that is, P-O--P-X) is the "best" estimate of the underlying causal structure. Consider the nature and context of the event. At issue was foreign policy, a subject area on which students of public opinion have noticed for some time that the public tends to be less strongly opinionated than on domestic issues and, therefore, more willing to follow government policy.28 Add to this the fact that the Truman Doctrine represented a new issue of crisis proportions for which competing cues from traditional alternative sources were as yet unformed, and we have an almost ideal setting for the reference process of opinion leadership.
Moreover, if views on the Greek-Turkish aid program were shaping Truman's popularity and were, therefore, primarily responsible for the statistical relationships in Table 7 , we should expect to find some change in the overall popularity of President Truman after the speech. On the March 26 poll the President's job performance rating stood at 60 percent approving, an increase of 11 percentage points since the January survey. It is difficult to read much in this change, however, since the President's popularity had been improving each month without exception since the previous October when only 27 percent approved. In fact, the January to March improvement is almost identical to the rate of increase his popularity had experienced for the previous three months. The Truman Doctrine pronouncement does not appear to have altered an upward trend already in progress. Finally, adoption of the reference model where evaluation of Truman shapes support of his program helps to explain other relationships presented below. 29 For a closer examination of the sources of opinion change, the sample has been partitioned into twelve subgroups in Table 8 according to their evaluation of Truman as president, partisanship as measured by the respondent's 1946 presidential vote, and education. Several patterns emerge among these groups in their level of support for aid to Greece. First, from the summary statistics and the percentage point differences between approvers and disapprovers, we can see that, for five of the six pairings, persons who approved of the President were more likely to endorse his aid request to Greece. The one exception is the group of poorly educated Dewey voters and this exception may be attributable to sampling error from the small number of disapprovers (N = 27).
The percentage point differences between approvers and disapprovers are greatest for Roosevelt voters. Two separate relationships appear to be producing these large differences. As expected, Democratic voters who approved Truman's job performance proffered the strongest endorsement to the Democratic President's legislative request. But partisanship is not simply additive for all of the subgroups. If that were the case, we should find Democratic disapprovers more supportive of the President's program than Republican (Dewey voters) disapprovers and perhaps even more than Republican approvers. Yet, with-in each educational category, Democratic disapprovers were the least supportive of the President's program. Perhaps for Democrats (Roosevelt voters) who for one reason or another had come to disapprove of the President, favoring his policies would create strong cognitive strain. For Republicans, disapproval of Truman may have been arrived at simply by referencing this opinion on their own partisan loyalty. Democrats who disapprove reached their opinion despite their partisanship, and thus likely invested greater ego commitment in it, to agree with Truman's proposals would be more disruptive of existing attitudes.30 
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As we change the focus from comparing percentage point differences within educational categories to comparing across them, a third pattern emerges. The percentage point differences across educational groupings have been extracted from Table 8 and are presented in a more readable format in Table 9 . With but one exception, the higher the educational level, the more pervasive was support for aid to Greece.31 When controlling for the 1944 vote and evaluation of Truman, the well educated citizenry was the most supportive of the Truman Doctrine.32 One might think that just the opposite tendency would be more likely-that is, persons with a weak informational base, as indexed by poor education, should be more susceptible to influence from a prestigious source such as the President. Yet the finding corresponds to other research on opinion change in the mass public. Mueller has reported that support for both the Korean and Vietnam wars came disproportionately from the well-educated segments of the public.33 And similarly from an analysis of a large series of cross-sectional surveys, Johannes Pederson concluded that attentive citizens provide the main source of change in public opinion on emergent issues. 34 
Summary and Conclusion
The Truman Doctrine speech is exceptional as a historic event, yet typical as an exercise of opinion leadership. It is exceptional from a historical perspective because it has come to be viewed as ushering in TABLE 9 Educational Differences in Support for the Truman Doctrine (From Table 8 
